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Abstract 
A story of connectivity, part of the international diplomatic arena with routes, hubs, and 
corridors has been set as the mantra of the Belt and the Road of China. In 2013, when China’s 
paramount leader, Mr. Xi took a visit in mostly Central Asia and Southeast Asia, he initiatively 
proposed to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. It is 
then being abbreviated as OBOR (One Belt One Road) which represents China’s audacious 
vision to transform political region in Europe, Africa, and Asia for decades to come. The 
initiative absolutely calls for a greater integration of those regions into a cohesive economic 
area through building infrastructure, increasing cultural exchanges, and broadening trade. 
This centerpiece of Mr. Xi’s foreign policy has been categorized as the most important 
feature of the country to show its charm in offering a deeper connection and a bundle of 
developmental pledges towards all neighboring countries. Indonesia, the south neighboring 
country of China, is also included in the orbit of convergence with Jokowi’s vision and foreign 
politics strategies ‘to be a global maritime fulcrum.’ Both are in attempt to reinvigorate what 
each apprehends as their previous maritime glory. However, there are several limits of 
cooperation between the two sides, in particular the territorial issue in the South China Sea. 
Confrontations in fishing and coast guard ships, including a domineering manner of China’s 
foreign conduct are the current impediments to advance cooperation. Yet, it is evident that 
Indonesia will need Chinese investments in order to realize the Global Maritime Fulcrum. All 
in all, this research aims to analyze the concept of connectivity between two sides as well as 
to explore on how Indonesia and China could maintain their partnership to achieve each 
specific national goals without stepping on each other’s toes. 
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Introduction 
In September 2013, Mr. Xi visited Kazakhstan to champion the initiative of jointly 
establishing Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 
popularly known as One Belt One Road (OBOR). One month later, Mr. Xi came to 
Indonesia Parliament House and delivered his speech about the paralleled idea of its 
Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision. 
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From the speech, we could infer that Mr. Xi emphasized Indonesia is playing 
significant role towards the realization of China’s ambitious and gigantic foreign 
objectives. After has been put in the presidential office in 2012, the current General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of China began to transform a profound shifting in 
the nature of China’s foreign policy. China’s paramount leader’s “Chinese dream” 
has been begun in the making a profound shift to the nature of Chinese foreign policy 
as it was reflected during a speech at a foreign affairs conference on 24 October 2013.1 
Mr. Xi’s new version of China’s foreign policy strategically known as “Fen Fa You 
Wei” (奋发有为, “striving for achievement”). It is finally replacing the long famous 
“Tao Guang Yang Hui” (韬光养 晦, “hide capabilities and keep a low profile”) which 
was formulated by Den Xiaoping in the early 1990s.2 The new vibe of China’s foreign 
policy drives for the importance of China’s neighborhood policy, basically on how to 
implement good diplomatic relations for the sake of the obtainment of its ‘centenary 
goals’, including the realization of One Belt One Road initiative. 
 China has exactly been turning to outward investment to deal with the 
country’s expansive nature of industrial capacity and excess of foreign exchange 
reserve garnered through a long period of astonishing economic growth. The current 
signature China’s foreign and economic policy portrays a resemblance with the US 
Marshall Plan back in cold war era, OBOR initiative is startling. The Belt itself stands 
as a far-reaching network of overland road, interconnected rail routes, natural gas and 
oil pipelines, and other infrastructure projects running from Xi’an in central China, 
Central Asia, West & Southeast Asia and finally to Western Europe and Moscow.3 
                                                          
1 Camilla T. N. Sørensen, “The Significance of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” for Chinese 
Foreign Policy: From “Tao Guang Yang Hui” to “Fen Fa You Wei”, JCIR: VOL. 3, No. 1 (2015) 
2 Ibid 
3 The State Council The People’s Republic of China, “Full text: Action plan on the Belt and 
Road Initiative”, 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm, 
accessed on April 11, 2017 
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The Road encompasses China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean in one route. The land will focus on jointly building a new Eurasian 
Land Bridge channeling the Indochina Peninsula economic corridors by relying on 
core cities along the OBOR initiative. Meanwhile at sea, China emphasizes on 
concurrently building uninterrupted and efficient transport routes connecting major 
sea ports along countries within OBOR initiative. Chinese top leaders moreover 
ensure OBOR is not confined by specific geographical factor, a specific historical 
circumstance or a specific economic situation, it will be open to the rest of the globe.  
 Like a re-awakening lion, China’s visions are exceptional and influential 
under a leader who tries to show China’s charm towards its neighboring states, 
including Indonesia, a contested or neutral country amidst the growing of rivalry 
between China-US. Jokowi too attempts to call the world’s attention by emphasizing 
his thundering doctrine, Indonesia as Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). The previous 
maritime glory from both of the countries are the basis for them in reviving and 
rebuilding respective greater and authentic identities. The Maritime Silk Road as 
embed in OBOR is rooted on the traditional sea routes taken by the Ming dynasty 
explorer Zheng He in the 15th century. On the other hand, Indonesian GMF is to 
awaken the traditional motto of Jalesveva Jayamahe (at sea we are victorious). There 
are five pillars within forming the foundations of GMF, consisting of: i) rebuilding 
Indonesia’s maritime culture; ii) better management of Indonesia’s maritime 
resources; iii) development of Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure and connectivity; 
iv) intensifying Indonesia’s maritime diplomacy and; v) strengthening Indonesia’s 
maritime defense force. Based on the underlying principles, the GMF illustrates an 
inclination to domestic development rather than reiterating Indonesian maritime 
power to its neighboring states. The OBOR initiative compares to the GMF looks 
more like an engaging China’s foreign policy tool and comprehends a globalized 
nature as it pledges to maintain and foster closer interactions with its neighbors in the 
hope of setting a Sino-centric international configuration. Suffice to say that the case 
of Indonesia’s GMF, even though the maritime diplomacy is gradually entrenched in 
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Indonesia’s foreign policy, but the main objectives are not actually to strengthen 
Indonesia’s foreign relations. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
 The analytical content on this writing will be based on the exploration of two 
school of thoughts. 
First, in the pluralist school, especially Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s have 
made contributions that were remarkable to the cultivation of the international 
relations theory. They established influential book ‘Power and Interdependence’ and 
further introduced the conception of ‘complex interdependence’. The theorists 
recognize varied and complex transnational connections which simultaneously 
accounts the increasing amount of interdependencies between states and the societies. 
The states involved still use the military force and power balancing are decreasing 
but remain important.4 Thus, complex interdependence is characterized by three 
characteristics, involving first is the usage of multilayer channels of action between 
societies in interstate, trans governmental, and transnational relations, second is the 
absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues 
and third is finally because of the complex relations between states it brings about a 
decline in the use of coercive power in international relations. 
 Keohane and Nye illustrate that the decline of coercive power as a policy tool 
is because the intensity in economic and other forms of interdependence should 
increase the tendency of cooperation among states. Complex interdependence will 
help to explore the intense relation between Indonesia and China. Both of the 
countries are progressing in many sectors, hence simultaneously trying to reduce the 
power from each perspective. Even though in the reality, a domineering manner from 
one actor is inevitable. This is where complex interdependence also depicts the nature 
where one actor could be reliant to the other and the other also needs assistance from 
                                                          
4 The IR Theory Knowledge Base, “IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories”, 
http://www.irtheory.com/know.htm, accessed on May 3, 2017  
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whom he interacts with. In this context we can perceive both actors, Indonesia and 
China are actually reliant to each other. Indonesia will need major investment and 
cooperation from China, simultaneously China will ask Indonesia to become the 
nexus of its vision One Belt One Road. In the relationship we could see there would 
be clash and unity from both perspectives, it could be said in another words a nature 
of competitive cooperation. 
  
Body 
  After delving in the theoretical framework, this context will bring a closer 
look to the harmony of maritime agendas of China and Indonesia, which is 
connectivity. China’s MSR seeks to connect the Mainland to Europe via the 
establishment of deep sea ports in mainly Central, Southeast Asia, and Africa. On the 
other side, Jokowi has planned to link the numerous islands that form the nation of 
Indonesia. If we take a closer look to Jakarta and Beijing relations after Mr. Xi came 
to Indonesia in 2013, seems that Jokowi was well-responding China’s signal to bring 
a warmer ambiance of both relations. Jokowi of course will need many investment 
from China to build many projected giant infrastructures in Indonesia including 24 
seaports and deep seaports that will connect north Sumatera, Jakarta, East Java, South 
Sulawesi, and Papua.5 China exactly can see the great potential of overlaps between 
Jokowi requests for more Indonesian ports and China’s offer to build maritime 
infrastructures in Indonesia under the framework China’s MSR. At the present time, 
China has been the enormous Indonesia’s trading partner and to further co-finance 
many infrastructure projects, the country decided to establish the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). Against the backdrop of APEC in 2014, Mr. Xi and Jokowi 
through intense deliberations have come into conclusion to agree on enhancing 
partnership on the areas of maritime development and infrastructure. In the midst of 
                                                          
5 Fabian Januarius, “Tol Laut Jokowi-JK, 24 Deep Sea Port Akan Dibangun”, 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/09/26/17055701/Tol.Laut.Jokowi-
JK.24.Deep.Sea.Port.Akan.Dibangun, accessed on April 11, 2017  
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2015, Indonesia finally has been approved on the membership within China-led AIIB 
and currently negotiating on the possibility of putting AIIB headquarter in Jakarta.6 
 As both of sides have been progressing on the closer interaction, in 2016 there 
happened a bilateral breach provoked by China linked vessels triggering Indonesia 
war on illegal fishing which not only impacts on Chinese fishing industry but also 
staining the future prospect of China’s MSR in Indonesia. A Chinese fishing boat, the 
Kway Fey was arrested by Indonesian patrol boat for fishing illegally in near Natuna 
Island.7 The Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry has several times seized 
Chinese-linked vessels until sunk a Chinese fishing vessel since 2015.8 Indonesia has 
a clearly strenuous stance on China and its war on the illegal fishing shows no sign 
of abating due to the high loss of the country’s revenue in the fishing industry, which 
up to US$ 25 billion per year.9 Jakarta then unilaterally revoked a bilateral fishing 
cooperation agreement signed between two countries in 2013 for China has 
trespassed one of the key elements of Indonesia GMF vision which is to revitalize the 
domestic fishing industry and permitted Chinese fishermen an unfair advantage in 
Indonesian waters.10 Tension escalated when Beijing in its defense stressed that the 
area where China’s vessel was caught, which is still in Indonesia’s EEZ was part of 
its fishing region. This notorious claim was based on the nine-dash line or ‘China’s 
historical traditional fishing zones’ which China always tries to prove in every 
regional and global fora related to the South China Sea issue, a long-standing dispute 
                                                          
6 “Indonesia incar markas Bank Investasi Infrastruktur Asia di Jakarta”, 
http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia/2015/03/150323_aiib_cina_indonesia  
7 “Susi ups game against illegal fishing”, https://www.pressreader.com/indonesia/the-
jakarta-post/20160404/281582354774423 
8 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia Sinks 23 Foreign Vessels After China Spat”, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/indonesia-sinks-23-foreign-vessels-after-china-spat/  
9 Jeffrey Hutton, ‘Indonesia Takes Tough Stance in Fighting Illegal Fishing’, The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/world/asia/indonesia-takes-tough-stance-in-
fighting-illegal-fishing.html?_r=0 , accessed on April 15, 2017  
10 Zhang Hongzhou, “Indonesia’s War on Illegal Fishing: Impact on China”, RSIS Commentary, 
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CO15192.pdf, accessed on April 11, 
2017  
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between China and several ASEAN countries. Jokowi then during his visit to Japan 
refused to acknowledge the nine-dash line and see Chinese government has 
undermined Indonesian sovereignty over the Natuna Islands. He further demanded to 
increase military presence in the Natuna Islands by the deployment of several 
Indonesia fighter jets and by the conduct of tighter surveillance anti-submarine 
aircraft to the islands. 
  Indeed a dilemmatic circumstance has been continuously casting a shadow 
on the Sino-Indonesia political relations and strategic cooperation. The aggressive 
and unresponsive movements signaled by Beijing when Indonesia demanded to enter 
in negotiation process to solve illegal fishing dispute represent that the “Chinese 
dream” and China’s neighborhood policy are, however, not all about “peaceful 
development” and “win-win” solution in terms of foreign conduct. Mr. Xi implicitly 
wants to reassert a tougher and bolder Chinese approach to safeguard Chinese 
sovereignty and guarantee the country’s core interests, in this context is when China 
tries to commit in preserving the claim of nine-dash line over Indonesia territory. 
Based on how previously Beijing declared that all the problems related to South 
China Sea must be solved within the realm of bilateral management actually depicts, 
China has its own way to solve the country’s maritime disputes. While OBOR 
initiative is pledging to promote a peaceful development to all country members, but 
China simultaneously will never renounce or compromise on China’s legitimate 
interests. China’s maritime confrontation with Indonesia is not new. Indonesia, the 
world’s biggest archipelagic state, has historically been flared-up at illegal fishing by 
its Asian neighbors including China. What China vessels have frequently done to 
Indonesia is considered as a violation of the sovereignty and simultaneously a robbing 
of Indonesia’s maritime resources.  
 
Conclusion 
 Though, OBOR initiative and GMF are complementary to each other, 
Indonesia-China relations is still being haunted by certain level suspicion triggered 
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by sovereignty violation as well as a domineering manner directed by China for the 
sake of the obtainment its centenary goals. To conclude, Sino-Indonesia relations 
could also be best exemplified by the school of thought of complex interdependence 
which to some extent draw the limit of cooperation between both countries. In one 
part of our world there is the prevalent ruler which stresses the realist point, this one 
actor under anarchic scenario is trying to maximize its strengths and benefits. 
Meanwhile, in the other part, there is an actor keeping aside their conflicts to 
cooperate with other for the betterment of its nation and strategic gains. For 
Indonesia, even though the country intends to tackle IUU fishing which has carried a 
big loss for the country, but the legitimate interest of foreign investors need to be 
secured, given the pressure that the GMF vision must be funded by outside 
investment. For China, a mutual benefit based arrangement should be focused in order 
to secure Indonesia’s trust about its intentions of a long-term genuine cooperation.  
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